(Extracted
from Doan Ket Magazine, Austin Texas)
Editor Note: Being a
Vietnamese, one is always ready to shed blood to defend Vietnam from invasion
forces. Currently, China, under the communist regime, has been pursuing its
expansionism. They have occupied the Paracel Islands since 1974 by defeating
the Republic of Vietnam Navy (South Vietnam). They have also occupied many
islands from the Spratly Islands since 1978 after defeating the communist-ruled
Vietnam Navy. This article, even though might not reveal facts our readers
would like to know, has been published un-edited as a reminder from the editor:
"a nation destiny is in the hands of its own people."
I.
At the beginning of 1974, the Naval
Headquarters of Riverine Mobile Operations just moved from Binh-Thuy (Can-Tho)
to Cat-Lai for few months. Before that, Staff Sections used to have Sunday off
only, after the move they were given extra Saturday afternoon off. I did not
recall the reason why I stayed at the Headquarters on the previous Saturday
before the battle between the Republic of Vietnam and the People Republic of
China Navy.
Around
two o'clock that Saturday afternoon, an on duty officer from Operation Center
phoned me that a general from the Joint General Staff wanted to talk to me on a
"hot line." Despite of being a low-ranking officer, I was holding a
pretty important position in the Naval Headquarters, therefore, once in a
while, I had phone chats with those generals. But it seemed unusual that time.
These generals only worked on the weekends in case of extremely urgent
situations. Besides, the Naval Headquarters of Mobile Riverine Operations
commanded the Naval Headquarters of the 3rd and 4th Riverine Zones, the Naval
Headquarters of the Capital Special Zone, the Naval Headquarters of Patrol
Forces, the Naval Headquarters of Amphibious Forces, the Naval Headquarters of
Central Forces, as well as some infantry, artillery supported forces;
therefore, the Naval Headquarters of Riverine Mobile Operations was responsible
for operations covering the entire waterways of the 3rd, and 4th Military
Regions, it seldom got direct order from the Joint General Staff . There ought
to be something very important.
On
the other end of the line, it was General Tran-Dinh-Tho, the Joint General
Staff /J-3. After a brief conversation, I was ordered to report back to the
Admiral (1) for dispatching 60 seal men to Tan-Son-Nhat airport immediately
that afternoon. I called a "hotline" to the Admiral's house but he
was out. At that time, I had already planned to stroll downtown after work, and
did not want to stay late, I was trying to unload my assignment to others.
After telling the on duty officer to contact Commander Hiep, Commander of VNN
Naval Commando (LDNN- Lien Doan Nguoi Nhai), to prepare men and weapons, I
reported back to the Naval Headquarters, carefully wrote down on the daily log
and the operation log, had Commander Anh, the on duty officer at the
Headquarters, follow up the operation. After that, I delightedly drove back to
Saigon.
A
week later, through reports from the Operation Center, I learned that those 60
seal men had been flown to Da-Nang to join military units who guarded some islands
of the Paracel Islands. Radio stations and newspapers started to comment about
China intention. At the Naval Headquarters, people were pretty calm, they
thought their navy was one of the top ten in the world with modern cruisers
received from the US. Furthermore, the Seventh Fleet was nearby... nothing to
worry about.
Around
middle of that week, the Operation Center submitted a telegram from the Seventh
Fleet. The telegram reported a China fleet of 42 battleships and 2 submarines
were heading towards the Paracel Islands... The situation looked serious
especially with those submarines. I myself learned combat technique against
submarines and torpedoes; however, it was just a lesson, at that moment, I no
longer recalled what I had learned. Probably, my brothers on the ships would
not also remember much due to little exercise. I could imagine people from the
Naval Headquarters on Sea were in such a tough time.
Finally,
the Paracel Islands battle exploded. The frontier territory on the sea was
seized upon by China. The loss caused a deep agony to the South Vietnamese.
Ironically, the North communist Vietnam never said a single word of objection
about the invasion. Their reaction was just like nothing ever happened. On the
South Vietnam side, the American friend turned away. Even not helping the South
Vietnam to rescue many soldiers who were drifting about for weeks.
One
or two months after the battle, the Naval Headquarters formed a committee to
investigate the Paracel Islands battle. Commodore Dinh-Manh-Hung, who was my
direct commander, became chief of the investigation committee. I was appointed
its secretary. The committee worked for few months, interviewed each soldier,
examined each warship, and contacted involved departments, to collect details
about the battle. Especially, the effectiveness of on board cannons, which were
equipped with special electronic gears (considered as the most advanced at that
time) to automatically adjust themselves while shooting; but it did not seem to
fully utilize those advantages, as well as other problems during firing.
Due
to my duty in the committee, I could have known a lot more details about the
battle. But at that time, I did not pay attention much about the work, I
re-assigned most of the tasks to an assistant, Lieutenant Junior Grade Lan. It
is such a shame on me. I was one of few persons who somewhat involved from the
beginning of the battle until the end of the investigation. Unfortunately, I
could only remember vaguely. However, in the course of investigation, there are
few facts which I still remember. Those facts which have not been mentioned by
an officer who directly commanded the South Vietnam Navy in the battle whose
report has been partially covered in the second part of this article.
Few
days before the battle, the enemy kept irritating the South Vietnam forces by
intentionally steering their ships to hit the South Vietnam ships. We had to
keep ours moving to avoid collision. Few times, both sides made physical
contacts. The South Vietnam soldiers were eager to fight but had to wait for an
order to open fire. They were on a 24 hour alert with guns trained to the
enemy. Usually, during the stand off, both sides should keep the ships far
apart but within the cannon range; on those days, both sides were very close
within rifle range.
Finally,
the South Vietnamese fired first before the enemy could have time to reinforce
their fleet. It was 10:25 AM, Saturday morning, Jan 19, 1974. The first shell
hit and set fire on one of the enemy ships. This incident was contrary to
reports from the Saigon Radio and RVN Armed Forces Radio in which the enemy
fired first, and the South Vietnam ships acted in self defense only. Because of
military discipline, nobody dared to correct it. After the battle, except the
HQ10 was sunk, the remaining 3 ships were hit by around a thousand bullets and
shells. The least seriuos casualty (probably HQ16) got about 820 wounds. During
the battle, HQ16 got a 127 mm friendly fired shell right at the engine
compartment, fortunately the shell did not explode. Otherwise, HQ16 would have
been sunk as well because the engine compartment was the most critical area of
the ship.
Obviously,
there are more to tell about the Paracels Battle. Those who participated in the
battle could offer more details which had been expected from many people.
During the recent New Year get together (1998) of Bach-Dang Club in San Jose,
many details of the brief battle were told by an authority, a former Commander,
also a scholar, Commanding Officer of Radar-Picket Destroyer Tran-Khanh-Du, DER
- HQ4; a famous South Vietnam warship, which had sunk 14 North Vietnam ships,
and was one of the South Vietnam ships which was participating in the battle
from the beginning to the end.
Before
getting deeper into the report from scholar Vu-Huu-San, it is worth while to
mention about a plan to get back Paracel. In an intermediate staff training
session for officers in Saigon, Navy Captain Do-Kiem, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operation, the Navy Headquarters, while answering questions from officers about
the prospect of retaking the Paracel Islands and how, said that Vietnam Navy
had not been ordered to. If it was going to happen, Vietnam Navy would rely on
the advantage of outnumbering soldiers (in the battle area) and high speed of Patrol
Craft Fast (PCF) boats to carry out the operation.
II.
This section has been extracted
from the article "Twenty-Four Years after, in Remembrance of the Paracel
Battle, in Commemoration of Lost Soldiers" of former Commander Vu-Huu-San.
(2)
One
foreign friend who had knowledge about Vietnam, asked: "in January 1974,
with an underdog navy forces, why did the South Vietnam challenge the more
powerful China fleet?"
This
seems like a logical question.
Twenty
four years ago, US Navy officers stationed in Vietnam also thought that the
South Vietnam Navy would have quietly withdrawn. To further isolate South
Vietnam, the US not only informed that they would stay out of the dispute, but
also blocked the use of torpedoes, withdrew the US fleet and firmly refused to
help rescue soldiers on the sea after the battle... They did never expect the
little South Vietnam again to pick a fight with the giant China.
The
Vietnamese, even though not directly participated in the battle, many of them
would give the same answer as following:
To
defend the country, even death, the South Vietnam Navy determined to fight. The
Paracel Islands is a part of Vietnam territory, the Vietnamese vow to defend
it. The South Vietnam Navy exchanged fire with the invaders, fought with all his
strength. Many worldwide observers, at first were wondering, later were
admiring the Vietnamese courage.
China
was not beaten that time; however, worldwide newspapers and magazines did
report that event with favorable commentaries toward South Vietnam.
On
those days, we defended the land on behalf of millions Vietnamese. It was
nearly 200 years after the Dong-Da victory of King Quang-Trung in 1789, the
South Vietnam Navy stood up to fight again the northern invaders.
Unfortunately, the South Vietnam Navy was an underdog in comparison to China
Navy. So we could not defeat the enemy as our ancestors had done before. As the
result, the Paracel Islands have been taken by the enemy.
Being
the most senior Commodore (3) at sea in those years of 1973-1975, Field-Commander
of the operation to defend the Paracel Islands at the earlier stage, and
Captain of the destroyer Tran-Khanh-Du, DER- HQ4, I myself recognized the
courage and fight-until-death determination of many soldiers. Therefore, the
South Vietnam small fleet had caused heavy casualty to the enemy fleet: two
ships sunk and two heavily destroyed.
Today,
being here in front of you, on behalf of many soldiers, I would like to share
with you several viewpoints:
-
First, to have a silent moment dedicated to lost heroes while they were
defending the Paracel Islands.
-
Secondly, to affirm the determination of the South Vietnam Navy to carry out
their duty in 1974.
-
Lastly, to confirm that the South Vietnam Navy fleet HQ4, HQ5, HQ16, HQ10 did
fire at the enemy first.
The
moment of silence to remember lost soldiers at the Paracel Islands battle was
observed. We, the survivals, would like to share our thought with those lost
soldiers:
Fallen
friends! We were together on the same fleet heading toward the Paracel Islands
that year. You did not come back to see your families as we did.
You sacrificed your lives to protect our fatherland. You fought until death.
You did fulfill your duty. Glory to the departed heroes whose bodies lie
resting forever in the Vietnamese waters.
To commemorate your sacrifice, we were praying for your souls:
To our lost soldiers, who sacrificed their lives in the Paracel Islands battle,
Eastward are hungry devils competing for oil and wishing to dismenber our
bodies.
Don't go northward where filthy red fiends are showing their fangs and claws.
Westward is the world of craziness and materialism and money grubbing.
Southward used to be our promise land now lost, our people fled our land for
every corner of the globe.
So please follow the wind, go to the farthest horizon.
Where cloud and water met to unite you with our ancestors.
We, the survivals, still determined to continue to walk our unfinished path.
When the time came we would reunite after death in the next few decades.
On
the second viewpoint, we heartily agreed with former Commander
Pham-Trong-Quynh, Commanding Officer of the HQ5. Even though, everybody knew
that the South Vietnam Navy participated in the battle, however, Commander
Quynh and I would like to bring up few details which had not been mentioned
before.
In
the Paracel Islands battle, 1974, we fired until all the cannons became
inoperable and we had no more ammunitions.
We
faithfully obeyed the orders from our commanders. We fought when we were
ordered to. Even in a desperate attempt, we were ordered to crash the ships
into the islands to claim our sovereignty with their wreckage . We did steer
our ships towards the suicide act.
Twenty
four years after the battle, we, the survivals, have searched numerous books in
many libraries, but could not find a loftier image where destroyer
Tran-Khanh-Du and cruiser Tran-Binh-Trong were preparing to carry out the order
to crash the ships without protest. Until late afternoon that day, another
order to withdraw from the Paracel Islands was issued, we steered our wounded
ships back to Da-Nang to bury the dead, send the wounded to hospitals, and fix
the ships, ...
On
the third viewpoint, we would like to report the incident where our battleship
fired first:
24 years ago, it was about the end of the Year of the Ox and beginning of the
Year of the Tiger, 01-17-1974, I, commander of HQ4, appointed by the Admiral,
Commander of the Navy Coastal Force of the 1st Military Region, to be the
commander of Operation Paracel Islands to protect the islands. It was the only
signed document about the operation. All the subsequent orders had been
transmitted by radio.
At
that time, HQ16 who had been at the Paracel Islands earlier, reported many
Chinese warships, landing-craft, disguised as fishing boats. The Chinese
already occupied Drummond, and Duncan. The Chinese fleet patrolled the
surrounding area. HQ16 also sent 15 persons to guard Money.
On
01-18-1974, HQ4 sent 13 persons to guard Robert.
On
01-19-1974, when HQ5 and HQ10 joined the South Vietnam fleet at the Paracel
Islands, Navy Captain Ha-Van-Ngac, who was the Commander of Sea Patrol
Flottila, took over the commanding post.
The
South Vietnam fleet tried unsuccessfully to use seal men to recapture Duncan
from the Chinese. After that, the South Vietnam ships were ordered to prepare
for the battle.
The
Chinese side had 11 warships, with many more behind and 300,000 sailors,
planes, and many types of missiles. The South Vietnam side had only 4 ships:
Destroyer Tran-Khanh-Du (DER) HQ4, two cruisers (WHEC) Tran-Binh-Trong HQ5 and
Ly-Thuong-Kiet HQ16, Patrol craft escort (PCE) Nhat-Tao HQ10.
Those
were only South Vietnam warships thrown into the battle at that time. Other
ships were too far away. South Vietnam Air Forces with F-5 fighters could not
fly that far from their base. We realized that we had to fight alone.
The
battle lasted from 10:25 AM to 11:00 AM. When HQ10 fired on the island, HQ4,
HQ5, and HQ16 together fired at the enemy ships. HQ4, with two 6,000-horsepower
engines, ran at full speed and fired cannons, heavy machine guns non-stop.
Most
of the cannons on board were rapidly firing capable. HQ4 was about 1,600 yards
from the nearest enemy ship. Therefore, most of its shots hit the enemy ship.
The
first 5 or 6 minutes of the battle would decide the fate of engaging ships.
Enemy ships sank, our ship sank. Two enemy ships and our HQ10 were put out of
action during this short period.
Our
ships, with speed of 20 knots, and enemy ships, with speed of 25 knots, moved
away from each other at 45 knots, about the automobile speed of 60 mph or 85
km/h on highway. From the distance about 6 miles or 8-9 km, it was getting more
difficult to shoot at the target because enemy ships became smaller and the
ship's decks were only 2 meters above the water.
The
Paracel Islands battle was a pretty unique battle. Both South Vietnam and China
fleets intertwined while exchanging fire. An 127mm shell from HQ5 accidentally
hit HQ16. Section 2 with HQ4, and HQ5 was just luckier than Section 1 with
HQ16, and HQ10. My ship, HQ4, could inevitably get hits by others.
"Friendly fire" at the Paracel Islands battle was different from one
in a similar case of the US Navy in Operation Desert Storm, that meant the
South Vietnam fleet accepted the risk. It proved that the South Vietnam fleet
was not afraid of the enemy instead they wanted a good fight. That attitude
might scare off the Chinese. You all had heard other stories which our troops
requesting artillery fire right on their positions to kill the enemy and also
themselves when they were outnumbered by the enemy and could no longer hold on
to their positions. The Paracel Islands battle was also similar.
The
South Vietnam fleet planned to have an upper hand by a "swift attack and
swift victory" before the enemy could be reinforced for counter-attack.
After half an hour of fire exchange, both fleets got further away. As predicted
earlier, there were 4 glaringly white waves moved towards the Paracel Islands
from the Northeast. They were 4 more missile ships coming to reinforce the
enemy fleet.
The
next day, the Chinese occupied the entire Paracel Islands.
...
There
is no fear now to deny the fact that the South Vietnam fleet opened fire first.
When enemy invades our country, everybody has to fight against them. Being a
soldier who participated in the battle 24 years ago, I would like to recall
that:
The
destroyer Tran-Khanh-Du HQ4, while trying to stop the enemy from occupying more
islands on the afternoon of 02-18-1974, rammed the side of a Chinese ship. No
matter how obstinate they could be, they had to step back when seeing a big
hole on the upper side of their ship.
After
the failed landing attempt to retake Duncan Island, our fleet had no choice but
to fire first at the enemy. Even though we knew that we could not protect the
Paracel Islands afterward, we still wanted to sink as many enemy ships as
possible.
It
was sad to learn that in 1988, the communist Vietnam troops could not return
any fire while the Chinese troops defeated them at the Spratly Islands, but
their lleaders submissively came to the negotiation table with the Chinese
instead. Any devoted soldier all knows that one has to fight in order to have
peace talks...
III.
Re-evaluating the Situation of
South Vietnam:
After
the Paracel Islands battle, even though the South Vietnam Navy did not bring
back victory as their ancestors had done, people were still welcoming the
returning soldiers as heroes. As a tradition to honor country heroes and
heroines, a street in Saigon was named after Commander Nguy-Van-Tha, commander
of Patrol craft escort Nhat-Tao HQ10 who died in action at the Pracels.
After
the North Vietnamese Communists overran South Vietnam in 1975, the street named
after that hero no longer existed. Many others who participated in the Paracel
Islands battle were thrown in re-education camps. The betrayers who exchanged
our land for weapons to suppress his own people were referred to by Frank
Ching, a reporter of the Far East Economic Review, in the article
"Reassessing South Vietnam" on 02-10-1994.
"Very
few governments are prepared to admit their mistakes, no matter how obvious
they are. Such as that of the Vietnamese Communists.
Even
though the Vietnam Communist rulers no longer follow Marxist-Leninist socialism
except for the name, they are not willing to admit it. However, their market
economy policy is itself an admission.
The
Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) was fighting on behalf of socialism to conquer
South Vietnam. During the war, they had aids from all communist-ruled
countries, especially Moscow and Beijing. The bloody war killed many innocent
people, severely devastated the country. The toll is very high, until now they
are still paying for that, they have no choice but to switch to a market
economy as a late comer to stimulate the economy. However, they still cling on
the old ideology. Because of that ideology, in the past, Hanoi had been
carrying out many policies which now do not make any sense at all.
Hanoi
used to madly slander the South Vietnam government as an "Americans' puppet",
which was "cheaply selling national interests." Those accusations are
unfounded, and gradually, people have realized that those accusations should
have been attributed to Hanoi. Looking back at the events 24 years later, it
was obviously the Saigon government that many times stood up for the sake of
the country, not Hanoi. The Paracel Islands dispute is an example.
In
the recent years, the Indonesian government has sponsored conferences to
discuss the South China Sea issues. In every such conference, the VCP
government once again awkwardly tried to explain their silence when the Chinese
invaded those islands, which now it claims possession of.
According
to the VCP government, China took advantage of the unrest political and social
situations in Vietnam and in the world at the time to use military forces to
invade the Paracel Islands. The reason was very weak and also did not explain
Hanoi silence at the time. Twenty years have passed, history has corroborated
many facts. It is time to recognize the South Vietnam government's merits.
Hanoi should recognize that too, and admit the fact that while South Vietnam
bravely standing up to resist the Chinese invasion, Hanoi was still busy
flattering China. Hanoi has to admit the fact that the South Vietnam government
cared for the country more than Hanoi has ever done.
Based
on many ancient historical documents to prove the ownership of two
archipelagoes, especially the document "Phu Bien Tap Luc" by
Le-Quy-Don, Vietnam has a sound and legitimate claim. Vietnam has called the
two archipelagoes as "Hoang-Sa" and "Truong-Sa", where
China has called "Xisha" (Tay-Sa) and "Nansha" (Nam-Sa)
respectively.
In
the Paracel Islands battle, the South Vietnam fleet sank two Chinese ships and
caused damage to two others, whereas on the South Vietnam side, one Patrol
craft escort was sunk, 40 soldiers were captured. In 1988, when China invaded
the Spratly Islands, Hanoi forces let China sink 3 ships, kill 72 soldiers and
capture 9 others.
The
reasons for those invasions have been known far earlier. It is part of the
"Survival Space" Program, because China has foreseen the two main
national resources in Manchuria and Sinkang will soon be dry up. To carry out
the program, China started the easiest steps. It began with what the VCP had
promised China earlier. It was a secret agreement between the communist
governments of Vietnam and China.
According
to Reuter, on 12-30-1993, the VCP denied the secret agreement with China.
However, they could not prove that such agreement has not existed. Le-Duc-Anh
visited China and the Chinese told him to wait 50 more years to discuss about
the dispute. Might China look at Le-Duc-Anh as an ungrateful and disloyal
person, who forgets the earlier promise?
According
to the China Foreign Ministry, their sovereignty on those two Paracel and
Spratly Islands is indisputable (Beijing Review, Feb 18, 1980), because Hanoi
had already settled the matter with China. China also provides evidence to
support their claim:
-
In June 1956, two years after Ho-Chi-Minh formed his new North Vietnam
government, Ung-Van-Khiem, Deputy Foreign Minister of North Vietnam government
told Li-Zhimin, Charge d'affaires of the China Embassy in Hanoi that:
"According to Vietnam document, Xisha (Hoang-Sa or Paracel Islands), and
Nansha (Truong-Sa or Spratly Islands) are Chinese historical lands." [sic]
On
09-04-1958, the China government declared their territorial waters is 12
nautical miles, applied to all China territory, including Dongsha, Xisha
(Hoang-Sa or Paracel Islands), Zhongsha, Nansha (Truong-Sa or Spratly Islands).
Ten days later, Pham-Van-Dong, then the Prime Minister of the North Vietnam
sent an official message to Chou-En-Lai, Prime Minister of China to confirm
that "the Democratic Republic of Vietnam government recognizes and
supports the proclamation of the People Republic of China government on
09-04-1958."
Below
is the full text of the document:
The
Democratic Republic of Vietnam Prime Minister...
....
Dear
Comrade Prime Minister:
We
would like to inform you that:
The
Democratic Republic of Vietnam government acknowledges and agrees to the
proclamation of the People Republic of China on 09-04-1958 about the China
territorial waters claim.
The
Democratic Republic of Vietnam government honors that proclamation and directs
responsible departments to ultimately honor that 12 nautical miles territorial
waters claim of the People Republic of China in all relations with China on the
sea.
Respectfully
yours, Hanoi, 09-14-1958
Pham-Van-Dong
Prime
Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
It
should be noted that in the islands dispute between the two, China has only
invaded islands belong to Vietnam, but leaves alone other countries who also
claim their rights on those islands. Obviously Ho-Chi-Minh and Pham-Van-Dong,
did yield those islands to China. At that time, Ho was preparing to invade
South Vietnam, he needed huge aids from China, therefore blindly accepted any
conditions from Beijing, even giving up lands. To Ho-Chi-Minh, giving up those
two islands belong to South Vietnam happened only "on paper" (because
North Vietnam lost nothing?)
The
VCP is waiting for ASEAN's help to "fairly" resolve the dispute. On
the China side, after occupying the Paracel and Spratly Islands, they befriend
with the Philippines and Malaysia to be ready for discussion about how to share
the abundant natural resources in the disputed area without Vietnam
participation. In addition, China firmly states that they do not accept
settlement by any country about the dispute between Hanoi and Beijing.
Pham-Van-Dong
denied his mistake in his staatement on the Far East Economy dated 03-16-1979.
Basically, he alleged "war time" as a reason of his action.
In
1977, Pham-Van-Dong, answering a question about his official message to China
Prime Minister Chou-En-Lai to acknowledge and agree to the China claim on the
Paracel and Spratly Islands, also said that "During war time, I had no
other choice except that deal." Because Ho-Chi-Minh was so eager to conquer
South Vietnam and contribute to the world communism, he never hesitated to give
away the "future" land to China without knowing whether he could take
over the South later.
"During
war time, I had no other choice except that deal." Who started the war and
were willing to trade anything to carry out the war even selling a part of the
country? Selling lands to carry out the war, but after the war ended,
Pham-Van-Dong blamed on the war as a reason why he had to give up lands!
Nguyen-Manh-Cam,
Hanoi Foreign Minister also admitted: "The previous statement from our
government about the Paracel and Spratly Islands based on the following fact:
At that time, after the Geneva Agreement about Indochina, the territory below
the17th parallel, including those two islands, belonged to South Vietnam.
Besides, during that period, North Vietnam had to concentrate highest efforts
to fight the American war of aggression and to preserve independence.
Therefore, we needed a lot of support from friends all over the world. The
relationship between Vietnam and China at that time was very close, and we
trusted each other. To Vietnam, China was the valuable and enormous sources of
support. Based on that fact and urgent demands, the statement of our leadership
(to acknowledge and agree to the China claim on the Paracel and Spratly
Islands) was necessary because it directly served the fighting for independence
and freedom of the country. Especially, it met the immediate necessity to keep
the Americans from using those islands to attack us. That statement does not
affect the historical and legitimate basis of Vietnam ownership of the Paracel
and Spratly Islands." (Press conference in Hanoi, 10-02-1992, released by
Vietnam News Agency on 12-03-1992).
The
above statements confirms that China evidence is valid. What is happening today
related to the dispute is the result of deceitful and twisting statements
between the two communist brothers in the past. Today, no country wants to
resolve the dispute between communist-ruled Vietnam and communist-ruled China.
The reason is too obvious: The Vietnam Communist regime cannot annul diplomatic
documents and statements concerning relations with China which have been
intended to fool each other. Nevertheless, the Vietnam Communist regime is
unable to entirely separate from China while still copying Chinese-styled
"economic reforms" to "move forward to socialism. "
Footnotes:
(1) The official rank was "Deputy of Naval Commander on Riverine
Operations," most of people referred all general ranks in the navy as
"admiral," the same way as in US and British Navy.
(2)
Vu-Huu-San, Naval Officer Magazine, the Graduation Class of the Second Libra.
(3)
Commodore, tittle referring to the commanding officer of a task division, or of
a task force with several ships under one's command.
About "HoangSa Naval
Battle"
(From Kiem Do and Julie Kane,Chapter 10-
"Counterpart, A South Vietnamese Naval Officer's War", Naval
Institute, Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1998.)
...Even
though the Americans were now technically out of the fighting, Kiem still had a
U.S. counterpart, though the latter's role had changed considerably since the
signing of the treaty: the new man was an observer, rather than a helper, and
so quiet that Kiem had trouble remembering his name. He reported to the Defense
Attache Office, an arm of the U.S. Embassy located at Tan Son Nhut Air Base.
Prior to the treaty Kiem had been able to contact the U.S. Seventh Fleet
directly, but now he had to ask his counterpart to ask the DAO to ask the U.S.
Navy whatever it was he wanted. It was a cumbersome procedure, to say the
least. But Kiem didn't fully understand its implications until January of 1974,
when Red Chinese warships seized the Hoang Sa or "Paracel" Islands
that had been claimed by Vietnam since the early nineteenth century.
The
Paracel Islands lay about three hundred fifty kilometers east of Da Nang, in
the South China Sea. They were small, desolate, treeless, covered with crusted
bird droppings - which Madame Nhu had tried unsuccessfully to mine for
fertilizer a decade earlier - and ringed with jagged reefs that made beaching a
gamble. The biggest island, called "Pattle" by Westerners, had a
weather station that beamed typhoon warnings to the mainland and a single squad
of what had to be the loneliest regional forces in Vietnam. The VNN ran routine
patrols around the island, and Kiem himself had visited them several times
between 1963 and 1965. Once he'd even made arrangements to buy a goat, as a
treat for his sailors, from the Pattle Island army garrison. The soldiers
raised them but let them run free, since the sea was their fence.
"Listen," the squad leader had chuckled, "if you can catch them,
you can have two goats for the same price." Kiem's whole ship had turned
out to chase the goats around the island, slipping and sliding in the gooey new
bird-droppings until, hours later, the men and the goats had just fallen down
on top of each other, exhausted.
Northwest
of the Paracels, the sea had spit back three or four equally desolate islands
that had been occupied by Chinese fishermen for as long as anyone could
remember. The Chinese had never given the Vietnamese any trouble; in fact,
whenever a storm blew one of their fishing boats down to the Paracels, the
Vietnamese Navy would tow it back as a courtesy. Three hundred kilometers due
north of the Paracels lay Hainan Island, a vast Chinese landmass with its own
air force base and fleet of MIG-21 bombers. But it was so far away, nobody gave
it much thought.
According
to reports received by I Corps in Da Nang, however, Pattle Island was now
flying the Chinese flag, with two armored Chinese trawlers anchored nearby. And
Duncan Island, second in size to Pattle, had a Chinese bunker with soldiers
milling about and a Chinese landing ship moored right on the beach! Their
presence had been discovered by Captain Thu of HQ-16, one of seven WHECs
(high-endurance U.S. Coast Guard cutters) turned over by the United States to
the VNN under Vietnamization. Thu had been asked by the U.S. Consulate in Da
Nang to run an American civilian out to the islands, as a "special
favor"Ởa request that should have been routed through naval
headquarters, under the terms of the treaty. After dropping off the American and
half a dozen Vietnamese Army officers who were accompanying him, Thu had
decided to patrol for a day or two before heading back. Now the captain was
desperately radioing I Corps, asking what to do next.
I
Corps had notified naval headquarters in Saigon; headquarters had started
meeting with President Thieu, Thieu's cabinet, National Assembly leaders, and
the heads of the other armed forces; and Thieu's foreign minister was sounding
out the reactions of the international diplomatic community.
"If
we act fast, we can retake the islands," Kiem was urging Admiral Chon.
"But we have to rush more ships in now, while we still have the firepower
advantage. If we knock out the Chinese ships, the shore force will surrender
easily." The longer they delayed, the more likely was the chance that the
enormous Chinese Navy would be sending in reinforcements. In response, Admiral
Chon ordered Kiem to dig up proof of Vietnam's historical claims to the
islands. While Kiem was slamming and banging through library shelves and file
drawers like a lawyer conducting a title search, he learned from his
counterpart that his request to the U.S. Seventh Fleet to set up a "line
of interdiction" - to keep the Chinese Navy from moving south - had been
refused. Of course it was possible that the DAO had killed the request without
ever forwarding it to the U.S. Navy. There was no way to know.
While
Kiem was trotting in and out of briefings lugging an overhead slide projector
and a suitcase full of papers, Radar Picket Escort HQ-4 - the sleek, fast
ex-USS Forster - was gliding toward the Paracels from Da Nang. Late in the
morning of 17 January 1974 she landed a team of Vietnamese Navy commandos on
Cam Tuyen ("Robert") Island to yank up additional Chinese flags that
had been reported there. But the trawler had moved, and there were no Chinese
anywhere on the islandỞthe commandos couldn't have missed them, on a
stretch of bird poop only five hundred meters long. Having returned to their
ship, the commandos were just finishing lunch and dealing out cards when they spotted
two fast-moving, Komar-class motor torpedo boats churning up the sea to
starboard. The captain sounded the alarm to man battle stations, but as the men
scrambled to their positions, the Chinese Navy ships suddenly changed direction
and disappeared.
With
Chinese reinforcements on the scene, there was no longer much hope of retaking
the islands. But the Vietnamese Navy could still go in there, slap the Chinese
Navy on the face, and run back out again. If only the damn government would
hurry.
Permission
to attack finally came through on the morning of 18 January, with one
stipulation: President Thieu wanted the navy to try to "parley" with
the Chinese first. Hearing the news, Kiem cursed: more time wasted. But now the
flagship of the looming sea battle - HQ-5, another WHEC - began racing toward
the scene at top speed, 18 knots. HQ-10 - an MSF with its minesweeping gear
removed and about the size of one of the enemy's motor torpedo boats - set out
a couple of hours behind her. Kiem couldn't help noticing that all four of the
battleship captains - Thu, San, Quynh, and Tha - had been his students at Nha
Trang. He wondered how Captain Quynh of HQ-5 who tended to be nervous, was
going to do with On-Site Commander Ngac on board.
Vice
CNO Tanh flew to Da Nang to direct the battle from the I Corps CIC. Kiem and
Admiral Chon would be monitoring communication from the powerful CIC at Saigon
Naval Headquarters. They were trying to secure air coverage for the operation
from the Vietnamese Air Force, without much luck. The VNAF's jets flew too fast
to be able to "see" a target with human eyesight; over the ocean they
had to rely on CAP radar ships for guidance, which wouldn't be available in
time. What's more, by the time their short-range CF-5s and A-27s reached the Paracels,
their fuel tanks would be half-empty; they'd have to wheel right around and
head back home. "That's good enough," the navy told them. Finally the
air force agreed to make one overhead pass during the battle, to shore up the
fighting men's morale.
Near
midnight on 18 January, Captain Ngac positioned HQ-10 and HQ-16 close to the
bunkered shore of Duncan Island, and HQ-4 and HQ-5 on the island's other side.
The Chinese were now up to four torpedo boats; this way, each VNN ship could
cover one Chinese boat, north to south, while they waited for reinforcements to
arrive from Da Nang. With their steel hulls and hidden machine guns, the
Chinese "fishing" trawlers were still a threat, though. And the
landing ship was also sure to be well-armed.
As
the tide crested on the morning of 19 January, HQ-5 lowered a brace of rubber
landing boats over her side. Twenty Vietnamese Navy commandosỞlooking
sleek as otters in their dark wet suitsỞsteered the motorized craft
toward the shore of Duncan Island. Clambering to their feet in the wildly
crashing surf, they began staggering toward high ground. Their leader, a
lieutenant junior grade, went first, waving a white flag. Blinking salt spray
from his eyes, he saw that the Chinese ground force, bigger than expected, was advancing
from several different directions. He called out in Chinese for them to stop,
but they kept coming. Conferring with Captain Ngac by radio, he ordered his men
to retreat.
As
the Vietnamese began nudging their boats into the water, the Chinese opened
fire on their backs. The lieutenant and two of his men fell over dead in the
raging surf. As the survivors scrambled to get back to their mother ship,
Captain Thu of HQ-16, on the opposite side of the island, notified Captain Ngac
that one of the Chinese ships had just made a move to ram him.
"Request
permission to shoot," Captain Ngac radioed I Corps. Pacing the length of
the Saigon CICỞwood-paneled, softly lit, crammed with electronics
equipment, with a central Plexiglas plotting board and pulldown maps on the
wallsỞKiem wondered where Admiral Chon had gone. He asked a
communications officer to ring him. After calling around, the officer reported
back that Chon had boarded a flight to Da Nang. Kiem tried not to let his
surprise show on his face. "All right. Well then, call up the Vice CNO at
Da Nang," Kiem ordered. A few minutes later, the same officer reported
back that the Vice CNO was on his way to the airport to collect Chon.
"Oh,
mia madre," said Kiem. Could it be possible that Chon was hiding out to save
his skin? He could believe it of Chon but not of Vice CNO Tanh, one of the
navy's most highly respected officers.. But why hadn't Tanh sent a driver to
the airport, which was a good hour's drive from I Corps?
Thinking
it best not to start a war with Red China all by himself, Kiem sent one of his
junior officers to fetch the chief of staff. Although he hadn't been involved
in planning the operation, the middle-aged admiral was thrilled to jump in:
every Vietnamese schoolboy grows up dreaming of sea battles with China.
"Are you sure that President Thieu has authorized force?" he asked
when Kiem had finished his on-the-spot briefing.
"Yes,
Admiral," said Kiem.
"Well
then, give them the order," said the chief of staff, breaking into a big
smile.
"What
order, sir?" asked Kiem.
"Shoot!"
said the admiral.
"Yes,
sir!" Kiem called up Captain Ngac and told him that "Hometown,"
the Saigon CIC, would be taking over controls from "Solar," its
counterpart in Da Nang. "Report to us directly," he said. "Your
orders are to retrieve the landing party, if possible; then get out into the
open and shoot."
"Hometown,
this is Shark-5," crackled Ngac's voice. "Roger. Out."
Next,
Kiem contacted the air force and gave them the signal. Waiting for something to
happen, he began to worry about the condition of his ships. Because of the
pressure to keep them out on patrol no matter how bad their condition, HQ-10
was going into battle with only one engine working. And the forward 3-inch gun
on HQ-4 was out. Like a skunk or a porcupine, she'd have to point her rear end
at the enemy to shoot. Where were the two backup ships coming from Da Nang? Why
was the air force taking so long?
Kiem
recontacted Ngac: "Shark-5, this is Hometown. Are you in position?
Over."
"This
is Shark-5. Affirmative. Out."
"Then
shoot. Over." There was no immediate response from Ngac.
"Shoot!"
Kiem prodded. "Over!"
In
the course of the next forty-five minutes, the Vietnamese Navy sank one Chinese
Navy motor torpedo boat and one trawler. But HQ-10 took a direct hit from a
Chinese surface-to-surface missile and, spewing smoke and fire from her bridge,
went dead in the water with eighty-two men on board. And HQ- 16, listing twenty
degrees from a hole under the water level in her engine room, lost her radio,
electricity, and automatic governing system. Only her main engine was still
maneuverable.
Sweating
like crazy, despite the air-conditioning, Kiem asked his counterpart - who'd
been sitting there so quietly that Kiem had almost forgotten about him - to
recontact the DAO. With two VNN ships in trouble, would the Seventh Fleet
reconsider setting up a line of interdiction? "I'll try, Captain
Kiem," he said. A few minutes later, he notified Kiem that U.S. radar was
tracking an apparent Chinese MIG launch from Hainan Island. A Chinese
guided-missile frigate was bearing down right behind the planes, in the
direction of the Paracels.
"Looks
like we're going to have to terminate, sir," Kiem advised the chief of
staff.
HQ-10
was going under. The three remaining warships were given orders to retreat. At
first Captain Thu of HQ-16 thought he was going to have to beach in order to
save his crew, but his engineering officer persuaded him that they could make
it back to Da Nang on one engine, even though they were now listing forty
degrees. Kiem ordered HQ-4 to escort the wounded vessel. HQ-5 would head south
and begin an "expanding square" search for survivors.
For
the third time Kiem asked his counterpart to ask the DAO to get in touch with
the Seventh Fleet. This time, all he wanted was assistance in picking up
survivors. But the request was turned down.
On
the heels of the battle Kiem had to fly to Phan Rang to brief vacationing
President Thieu. He didn't dare tell him that the CNO and Vice CNO had missed the
only sea battle in modern naval history, although he mentioned the no-show by
the air force. The briefing took place under the shade of a brick gazebo built
right on the beach, while Thieu's family members came and went, looking for
towels or cigarettes.
"Don't
worry, Captain Kiem," Thieu soothed, "we'll get you another
ship." He was almost giddy, riding the wave of the battle's astonishing
public popularity; for even though their side had lost the islands and even
though HQ-16 turned out to have been hit by a "friendly" shell
stamped "Made in U.S.A.," they had sunk two ships to their
two-thousands-year enemy's one! The TV, radio, and newspapers were going crazy.
Homemade banners were flapping in the streets of Saigon and Da Nang. For a few
days everyone seemed to have forgotten the communists, who'd only been an enemy
for sixteen years. Even the communists were keeping their mouths shut, loath to
remind people that they were allied with the ancient enemy. President Thieu
ordered a champagne reception for the returning heroes in Saigon.
Kiem
didn't want another ship. He wanted the lives of his missing men. Four days
after the battle, a Dutch tanker pulled twenty-three HQ-10 survivors on life
rafts out of the ocean. They said that Captain Tha had been killed on the
bridge of his ship but that the other crew members had escaped to rafts. Five
days after that, a Vietnamese fishing boat picked up a raft containing fourteen
more survivors and one corpseỞa former petty officer of Kiem's, who had
died of exposure and dehydration just hours before. That still left more than
three dozen men unaccounted for. The Chinese government announced that they had
captured forty-eight prisoners, including one American - but those included the
Pattle Island Regional Forces and the six ARVN officers who had accompanied the
American civilian out there in the days preceding the battle. The U.S.
government explained to the world that the American had been "visiting the
islands at the invitation of a South Vietnamese Navy commander" - to
Kiem's astonishment, as no commander would dare take an American out there
without U.S. and VNN authorization.
The
United States had fed Kiem bad intelligence, too: there hadn't been any
"Chinese MIG launch," though Kiem had called off the battle on account
of it. What the hell was going on? Did it have anything to do with President
Richard Nixon's historic trip to China the year before or with the rumors of
deep-sea oil reserves near the Spratly Islands and the Paracels? Was the United
States going to sacrifice South Vietnam as an ally in order to set up a
lucrative trade with China? I can't believe it. The DA0 must not have passed my
requests to the Seventh Fleet, Kiem told himself for what must have been the
fiftieth time. He could believe that the U.S. government would let him down -
but never the U.S. Navy.